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ABSTRACT
The collapse of the Soviet Union, proliferation of nuclear materials, and
threat of international terrorist organizations propelled the emerging field of
Technical Nuclear Forensics (TNF) to the forefront as an international
security priority. Technical Nuclear Forensics leverages a multi-disciplinary
approach involving law enforcement, intelligence, scientific assets, and the
military to perform timely and accurate source attribution through the
analysis of nuclear and radioactive materials recovered from illicit storage,
interdicted prior to an attack, or collected shortly thereafter. Of utmost
importance, is the ability to identify and employ specific markers or
signatures that differentiate these materials and reveal details implicating
the perpetrators. The purpose of this research is to explore a novel
approach to Technical Nuclear Forensics and demonstrate the use of
Atomic Force Microscopy (AFM) for pre- and post-detonation analysis of
these materials by conducting a comparative ex-situ nanoscale
morphological and topographical characterization of three specifically
selected samples. Trinitite, otherwise known as "Atomsite" or "Alamogordo
Glass," was formed during the first detonation of a nuclear weapon, at the
Trinity Test Site, Alamogordo, NM, on 16 July 1945. Kharitonchik, an
analog of Trinitite, was formed during the Soviet Union's first atmospheric
nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk Test Site, Kazakhstan, on 29 August
1949. In both cases, the crater material, weapon, and test site
infrastructure were instantly vaporized in the intense heat of the explosion.
The vaporized material was sucked into the rising fireball, cooled,
condensed, and then fell to the ground as a melt-glass material. However,
Fulgurite, also known as "Desert Glass" or "Petrified Lightning," is naturally
formed by lightning strikes of the earth's surface (in this case, the sand
dunes at Jockey's Ridge State Park, NC). The lightning instantly melts the
sand, silica, or soil and fuses the grains together, forming an amorphous
mineraloid. Employing AFM, it is possible to determine the micro-structural
properties, geometries, surface roughness, and chemical surface
homogeneity of these samples. This initial study intends to lay the
groundwork for future research demonstrating the speed, accuracy, and
precision of AFM in the determination of provenance.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

It is a commonly held opinion, within the national and international security
communities, that it is not a matter of if a terrorist organization decides to use a
nuclear or radiological weapon but when. This is an exceptionally grave threat
because such an attack could cause catastrophic loss of life, extreme economic
consequences, profound and lasting social effects, as well as, public loss of
confidence

in

government

(Ulicny,

2009).

President

Barack

Obama

acknowledged the increased risk and its significance during a 07 April 2009
speech on nuclear weapons in Prague, Czech Republic, when he stated, "in a
strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the
risk of a nuclear attack has gone up" (Ulicny, 2009). As a counter-response to
this increased risk, the September 2006 National Strategy for Combating
Terrorism states:
The rapid identification of the source and perpetrator of an intended
or actual WMD attack will enable our response efforts and may be
critical in disrupting follow-on attacks. We will develop the capability
to assign responsibility for the intended or actual use of WMD via
accurate attribution - the rapid fusion of technical forensic data with
intelligence and law enforcement information (Ulicny, 2009).
In other words, we will find out who conducted the attack or attempted to conduct
an attack using WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction including Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield-Explosive) and we will hold
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them accountable by quickly leveraging a combination of scientific analysis,
intelligence, and law enforcement in the determination of provenance.

The

specific term given to this attribution process regarding those cases involving the
use of nuclear or radiological materials is Technical Nuclear Forensics.

It is

regarded by the United States government and the international community as
one of the most critical security missions in existence. Therefore, our purpose for
this research was to support the Technical Nuclear Forensics mission by
exploring the use of a proven, cutting-edge, analytical technique in a novel way.
That being said, the goals and objectives for this research were fairly simple and
straightforward.

First, we wanted to perform some ground-breaking work

regarding the potential use of Atomic Force Microscopy (AFM) in Technical
Nuclear Forensics.

Second, we wanted to demonstrate a unique analytical

capability using three specifically selected melt-glass samples representing post
detonation material (these samples include Trinitite, from the first detonation of a
nuclear weapon at the Trinity Test Site, Alamogordo, NM; Kharitonchik, from the
Soviet Union's first nuclear test at the Semipalatinsk Test Site, Kazakhstan; and
Fulgurite (aka "Desert Glass" or "Petrified Lightening"), from Jockey's Ridge
State Park, NC).

And third, we wanted to develop a way-ahead for future

research in the field.
The importance of this type of research cannot be overstated, as the
threat is very real.

In fact, according to the 2006 International Atomic Energy

Agency Nuclear Forensics Support Reference Manual, "illicit trafficking of nuclear
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and other radioactive material has been an issue of concern since the first
seizures in the early 1990s. By the end of 2004, Member States had confirmed
540 cases, while about another 500 remain unconfirmed" (IAEA, 2006).

In a

2006, Scientific American article, entitled, "Thwarting Nuclear Terrorism," Glasser
and von Hippel state that, if a well-funded, subnational terrorist organization
could obtain as little as 60 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU), then they
could construct a crude gun-type device like the World War II "Little Boy" weapon
that leveled Hiroshima with a 15 kiloton explosion.

The truly frightening

revelation from this article is that "more than 50 metric tons (50,000 kilograms) of
highly enriched uranium" are located at nearly 140 "often poorly secured" civilian
nuclear research facilities worldwide. Furthermore, in a November 2013 National
Journal Magazine article entitled, "A Glimpse at the Next Bin Laden," Michael
Hirsh wrote,
With the exception of Egypt—where the military has cracked down
on the Muslim Brotherhood—the Arab Spring uprisings have
opened up huge swaths of ungoverned territory in Muslim nations
that once cooperated with Washington against terrorism. The
toppling of strong autocratic leaders has led not to secular
democracy but to fractionalization, allowing some Islamist groups to
seize territory in which they might host terrorists cells in the way the
Taliban welcomed bin Laden. "There are at least 25 failed states in
the world, an unprecedented number," says Pascal Boniface, head
of the

Paris-based

Institute

for

International

and

Strategic

Relations. They stretch from Yemen and Somalia to Syria and
Libya and Iraq (Hirsh, 2013).
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In addition, Forecasting International Inc. published an article, on behalf of The
National Intelligence University, Office of the Director of National Intelligence,
and the Center for Strategic Leadership - U.S. Army War College, written by Dr.
Marvin J. Cetron and Mr. Owen Davies, in February 2008, entitled, "55 Trends
Now Shaping the Future of Terrorism." It stated the following:
We take it for granted that the elite among tomorrow’s terrorists will
have more than plastic explosives with which to make their point.
They will have nuclear weapons...Wherever secular government is
weak, it might easily be replaced by a much stronger and more
virulently anti-American theocracy with leaders drawn straight from
the terrorist movement...From here on out, nuclear terrorism is a
realistic threat...This is clearly the single most important trend for
terrorism (Cetron & Davies, 2008).
Lastly, during a 26 July 2011 United States Government Accountability Office
testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland
Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security
Technologies, David C. Maurer (Director, Homeland Security and Justice) and
Gene Aloise (Director, Natural Resources and Environment) were quoted, as
follows:
Terrorists smuggling nuclear or radiological material into the United
States could use these materials to make an improvised nuclear
device or a radiological dispersal device (also called a “dirty
bomb”). The detonation of a nuclear device in an urban setting
could cause hundreds of thousands of deaths and devastate
buildings and physical infrastructure for miles. While not as
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damaging, a radiological dispersal device could nonetheless cause
hundreds of millions of dollars in socioeconomic costs as a large
part of a city would have to be evacuated.—and possibly remain
inaccessible.—until an extensive radiological decontamination effort
was completed (Maurer & Aloise, 2011).
So the bottom line is that this is a very serious national and international
problem requiring immediate attention and the consideration of a variety of
analytical techniques to include novel approaches. Our first step in this project
was to determine the extent of the current research pertaining to Technical
Nuclear Forensics and AFM. Our literature review produced dozens of articles
addressing the threat of nuclear terrorism and the employment of Technical
Nuclear Forensics as a counter to this threat.

This thesis lists no less than

seventeen papers pertaining to nuclear forensics in general, nine papers focused
on the specific analysis of Trinitite, four papers addressing the investigation of
the soil samples in and around the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site, and one
paper commenting on the formation and morphology of Fulgurite.
A summary of the relevant information regarding nuclear forensics in
general reveals many consistencies throughout the literature.

Nearly all of the

papers acknowledge the importance of determining specific forensic signatures,
markers, or parameters (Joint Working Group, 2008; Kristo & Turney, 2013;
Mayer, Wallenius & Fanghanel, 2007; Stanley, Stalcup & Spitz, 2013). Similarly,
all seem to agree that there is a significant need for a comprehensive
international nuclear forensic database including technical reference material
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pertaining to, for example, nuclear fuels, uranium ores, weapon materials,
commercial reactors, and research reactors (Mayer et al., 2007). According to
Stanley et al. (2013), some of the significant challenges in the field of Technical
Nuclear Forensics include international cooperation and collaboration, the current
and future availability of qualified

expertise,

as well as,

research and

development in key technical areas like automated, field-deployable, analytical
instrumentation. Added to this, Mayer et al. (2007) mention safely working with
radioactive materials, chain-of-custody considerations, and the proper handling
of evidence as additional challenges confronting the Technical Nuclear Forensic
community.
In terms of the various analytical techniques employed, the literature
reveals a wide variety of approaches, including radiochemical separation, optical
microscopy,

scanning

electron

microscopy

(SEM),

transmission

electron

microscopy (TEM), X-ray fluorescence (XRF), neutron activation analysis (NAA),
and a full array of counting techniques, to include alpha spectrometry, gamma
spectrometry, accelerator mass spectrometry (AMS), resonance ionization mass
spectrometry (RIMS), secondary ionization mass spectrometry (SIMS), thermal
ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS), electron-dispersive X-ray spectroscopy
(EDX), and multi-collector inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (MCICP-MS), to determine such things as isotopic ratios, chemical impurities, age of
material, microstructures, and macroscopic parameters (Joint Working Group,
2008; Kristo et al., 2013; Mayer et al., 2007; Stanley et al., 2013; Tuniz &
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Hotchkis, 2004). However, none of these references specifically noted the use of
AFM in Technical Nuclear Forensic research.
A summary of the relevant information regarding the nine studies involving
the specific analysis of Trinitite also reveals many consistencies throughout the
literature. Salter and Harley (1965) employed gamma spectrometry to determine
the presence of 60Co, 137Cs, and 152Eu.

Similarly Mercer, Hypes, and Saey

(2010) used gamma spectrometry to determine that "the radioisotopes 152Eu
(T1/2=12.7 years) and 154Eu (T1/2=8.5 years) were generated by neutron
irradiation of natural europium in the soil, 137Cs (T i /2=30.1 years) was a fission
product from the nuclear detonation, and 60Co (Ti /2=5.3 years) was produced
mainly by irradiation of steel structures."

In 2006, a well-known study used a

combination of radiochemistry, alpha spectrometry, gamma spectrometry, and
beta counting...to determine specific activities of the "fission products 90Sr and
137Cs, activation products 60Co, 133Ba, 152Eu, 154Eu, 238Pu, and 241Pu, the remains
of the nuclear fuel 239Pu and 240Pu, as well as natural radionuclides 40K, 232Th,
and 238U and their progeny" (Parekh, Semkow, Torres, Haines, Cooper,
Rosenburg, & Kitto).

The results of this study suggested that various

radionuclides were "volumetrically incorporated" into the molten Trinitite glass,
including "fission products from 239Pu fission; activation products from neutron
reactions with the nuclear fuel, the materials used in construction of the Gadget,
and the local GZ soil; the remnants of unburned nuclear fuel; as well as
radionuclides of natural origin in the soil." In a similar fashion, Fahey, Ritchie,
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Newbury, and Small (2010) utilized a suite of analytical tools including alpha
spectroscopy, gamma spectroscopy, electron microprobe (e-probe), scanning
electron

microscopy

(SEM),

light

microscopy,

X-ray

florescence

(XRF),

autoradiography, and secondary ion mass spectrometry (SIMS) to conduct one
of the first studies considering the forensic analysis of post-detonation nuclear
debris in an attempt to retroactively understand the device that produced the
explosion.

They concluded that "bulk analytical methods are unable to

adequately tease apart populations of end-member components derived from
distinct starting materials, whereas microscopic methods can detect lower levels
of materials due to localized microconcentrations and spatial relationships."
Furthermore, with regards to Trinitite, they stated that "the visible heterogeneity
of the sample near the surface indicates that the material was not completely
mixed, forming a homogeneous glass, but rather specific signatures have been
preserved in the heterogeneity of the glassed material." This observation bodes
well for those seeking to attribute an attack to a specific organization by
examining the bomb material and debris. Using autoradiography on thin sections
and scanning electron microscopy energy dispersive X-ray spectroscopy (SEMEDX) analysis and alpha spectrometry on fine powder samples, Belloni, Himbert,
Marzocchi, and Romanello (2011) proposed a "detailed model of the overall
mechanism leading to Trinitite formation" to include suggesting a two-stage
process. Finally, the Bellucci research team (from the University of Notre Dame)
has published multiple papers regarding their analysis of Trinitite.

The first of

these studies that we reviewed involved the use of scanning electron microscopy
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(SEM), backscatter electron imaging (BSE), and energy dispersive X-ray
spectroscopy (EDS) to document "the 3D morphology of Trinitite-hosted metallic
inclusions and the first observations of alloys consisting primarily of Pb, Ta, Ga,
and W" presumably from the weapon components (Bellucci & Simonetti, 2012).
Bellucci et al. assert that understanding the local geology is essential to
differentiating bomb components from the local materials.

Furthermore, based

on chemical compositions, it is the metals (Fe, Pb) and radionuclides (Pu, U, and
related activation/fission products) that provide the greatest contrast.

Their

results emphasize the need for "non-destructive and micron- (sub-micron-) scale
characterization" prior to bulk dissolution methods, reinforcing the conclusions
espoused by Fahey et al (2010). The second study involved the largest sample
size to date and was conducted using gamma spectroscopy to determine the
distribution and behavior of various radionuclides associated with the Trinity
nuclear test; it suggested that "the energy produced in the Trinity test was
derived from the fission of both 239Pu and 235U" (Bellucci, Wallace, Koeman,
Simonetti, Burns, Kieser, & Walczak, 2013). The third and fourth studies used
laser ablation multi-collector inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (LAMC-ICP-MS) on polished thin sections to determine U isotopic concentrations
and Pb isotopic concentrations, respectively (Bellucci, Simonetti, Wallace,
Koeman, & Burns, 2013). Based on this research, Bellucci et al. concluded that
the "best forensic evidence to determine the provenance of a nuclear device lies
in the isotopic composition of heavy metals (Pb, Pu, and U)."
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Our literature review suggests that AFM could be useful with regards to
imaging and mapping the various aforementioned inclusions.

However, before

discussing the specifics pertaining to our research methodology, results,
discussion, and conclusion, the next two sections will briefly address some
background information regarding Technical Nuclear Forensics, as well as, some
background and scientific theory pertaining to AFM.
1.1 Technical Nuclear Forensics (TNF) Background
According to the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center, which
reports to and through the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, under the
Department of Homeland Security, Technical Nuclear Forensics is defined as:
The collection, analysis, and evaluation of pre-detonation (intact)
and post-detonation (exploded) radiological or nuclear materials,
devices and debris, as well as, the immediate effects created by a
nuclear detonation...Technical Nuclear Forensics, combined with
law enforcement and intelligence information, support nuclear
attribution - the identification of those involved with planned or
actual attacks using radiological or nuclear weapons or materials
(NTNFC, n.d.).
Therefore,

Technical

Nuclear

Forensics

serves

as

a

deterrent

against

proliferation, nuclear terrorism, illicit trafficking, and illegal dumping. This point is
further reinforced by the Joint Working Group of the American Physical Society
and the American Association for the Advancement of Science when they state
in their paper entitled, "Nuclear Forensics: Role, State of the Art, Program
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Needs" that a "believable attribution capability may help to discourage behavior
that could lead to a nuclear event" (2008). Technical Nuclear Forensics employs
a "whole of government" approach involving inter-agency assets from the
Departments of Homeland Security, Energy, Defense, Justice, State, and the
Office of the Director of National Security. Technical Nuclear Forensics seeks to
collect, analyze, and evaluate specific samples in order to identify physical,
chemical, elemental, and isotopic nuclear forensic signatures based on the
production, processing, or source material, helping investigators to determine the
age, origin, or intended use of the material (see Fig. 1).

N uclear Forensics
Nuclear Material

Nuclear Forensic Analysis
C h aracteristic P aram eters

Material History

wgagm

Processing
Source Material

Figure 1: From Nuclear Forensics - A Methodology to Reveal the Past of Nuclear Materials by
Maria Wallenius, Klaus Mayer, and Zsolt Varga of the European Commission, Joint Research
Center, Institute for Transuranium Elements, Karlsruhe, Germany (Wallenius, n.d.).
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On the operational side, Figure 2 (below) provides a simplified illustration
of a post-detonation,
employment graphic.

inter-agency,

ground-sampling

mission,

concept of

National Technical Nuclear Forensic (NTNF) mission

assets support the United States Government (USG) attribution process by
providing rapid collection, analysis, and assessment so that National Command
Authorities can make informed decisions in a timely fashion.

A Forward

Operating Base (FOB) is quickly established, from which sample teams can run
collection missions. Team 1 attempts to collect volatile samples, including dust
and fine or light particles that float for greater distances. Team 2 attempts to
collect refractory samples, including dense daughter products, unused fuel
oxides, and other small or spherical particles that condense out early. The Aerial
Radiation Detection Identification and Mapping System (ARDIMS) supports these
collection missions by providing real-time aerial surveys of radiological ground
deposition.

Personnel, equipment, and samples are processed through the

hotline for decontamination. Initial presumptive analysis is conducted in the DOE
Triage tent, which contains a number of field-deployable, analytical instruments
used for the rapid identification and characterization of the samples (at the
present, atomic force microscopy is not included in this suite of analytical
capabilities).

Samples are then transferred to national laboratories for more

extensive confirmatory analysis, while a strict chain of custody is maintained to
ensure proper evidence protection and preservation.

Experts agree that a

program to develop, test, and manufacture advanced, specialized, automated,
field-deployable equipment, as well as, sophisticated laboratory instruments for
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the purpose of conducting rapid and accurate Technical Nuclear Forensic
measurements is sorely needed in the United States (Joint Working Group,
2008).

NTNF supports USG attribution
s Operates in same space as Consequence Management Forces
* Linked to CM-but different mission focus

Reach back:
• DOE Labs
• JTF HQs
• 20® SUPCOM HQs
• Intel Community

ARDIMS

NTHf

Collection Area

Sample Tm #1

Sample Tm if2

Hotline

Kevlaato
• Deploy
♦ Interagency Coord. (FBI/ DOE)
I • FOB setup
I * Route Recon/Collection Planning
| • Collect Ground Samples

Figure 2: From National Technical Nuclear Forensics Mission Brief Slides (Esce, 2013).

1.2 Atomic Force Microscopy (AFM) Background
"Atomic force microscopy is an amazing technique that allows us to see
and measure surface structure with unprecedented resolution and accuracy" all
the way down to the arrangement of individual atoms (Eaton & West, 2010).
Unlike an optical or electron microscope, AFM physically feels the sample
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surface with a sharp probe (or tip), building a map of the surface height (see Fig.
3).
AFM: Tip-Surface Forces

in dynamic
m u rin g m adri:)
10 5

r6

£kc\-vaxk Pacts
Unracuve at fUpnUttc)

10' r W SurfaceT w n i
(AHnctml

i-contact

Lennard-Jones potential:

V(r)

A
r 12

B
r

<*

In most cases, the surface is sensed via repulsive forces (upward deflections)

Figure 3: AFM relies on tip-surface interactions characterized by the Lennard-Jones Potential
between attractive Van der Waal forces and repulsive forces due to the Born Quantum
Mechanical Effect (Veeco, n.d.).

AFM provides exceptionally high resolution in the Z-direction, well below
the 250 nm resolution limit of optical microscopes. In fact, AFM sensitivity can
measure down to 0.01 nm (or 0.1 angstrom)...roughly 1/10th the diameter of an
individual atom. Thormann, Pettersson, and Claesson (2009) state that probesurface

interactions "in the

range from

micronewtons can be detected."

a few

piconewtons to several

AFM produces "real" topography versus

pseudo-topography from back-scattering. AFM allows the use of different modes
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and probes to map different qualities, characteristics, and properties like material
modulus and stiffness. AFM makes it possible to image inclusions or impurities,
that are not otherwise visible, via lateral friction force scans and other modalities.
AFM requires relatively simple, quick, non-destructive sample preparation under
ambient conditions and produces equally fast results.

Lastly, the instruments

themselves occupy a relatively small footprint and require little in the way of
support infrastructure other than a clean, quiet, and vibration-free work space
with electrical power.
The three basic AFM modes include contact, semi-contact, and noncontact. Semi-contact and non-contact are often referred to as dynamic mode
AFM. This initial research was conducted using three variations of contact mode
AFM (CM-AFM) as follows in Figures 4 through 6.
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Basic Contact Mode
4 quadrant
photo detector

Cantilever
deflection

Laser

measurement

xyz*
stage

AFM
sample
stage

sam ple

Figure 4: Basic Contact Mode AFM utilizes a sharp probe (or tip) at the end of a flexible
cantilever to interrogate the sample surface in a raster graphic pattern.
The tip-surface
interaction is measured and recorded via the deflection of a laser off of the cantilever onto a
photodiode as height data (Yashvant, 2013)

Friction Force
quadrant photodetector

laser
holder

cantilever

normal -'C
force A
friction it= = L sample

Figure 5: Friction Force scans are conducted using the same contact mode set up as before,
however, in this case, the system measures and records the torsion of the flexible cantilever as
the tip moves laterally across the sample surface, indicating different material friction force
coefficients and chemical compositions (Friction Force Graphic, 2013).
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Force Spectroscopy
Approach

Force Calibration Plot
*—

Jump to contact

Extending

—* Retreating
Contact
Adhesion

S etpoint

Pull-off

2.5nm
2 position - 2.50 nx/div

Figure 6: Force Spectroscopy is also conducted using the contact mode set up. For these
measurements, the tip is approached vertically towards the sample, while the cantilever deflection
is monitored. Then the tip is retracted towards the initial position. The cantilever deflection is
plotted versus the vertical piezo displacement for each direction (Veeco, 2000).

Each of the three contact mode AFM variations used a special silicon nitride
(SiNi) probe with a micro-fabricated cantilever of monolithic design (see Fig. 7).

12 ym

Thickness

Wedge tip with 12 pm overall tip height
and > 800 nm effective tip height
Double tip spacing 4.5 pm
Tip Radius of curvafure < 15 nm
Tip Set Back (first tip) < 12 pm

Cantilever Backside Coating:
h
10 nm Cr
h i 60 nm Au

Half Cone Angles:
70° - from Top and from Side
15° < at the apex (last 200 nm)

Figure 7: Budget Sensors SiNi Soft Contact Mode AFM Probe with 4 Silicon Nitride Cantilevers
(triangular, 2 different lengths); Cantilever lengths: 100 pm and 200 pm; Coating: 70 nm thick
Gold/Chromium (SiNi probe, n.d.).
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2.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The Institutional Radiation Safety Committee at The College of William
and Mary approved all procedures associated with this research via Protocol
Approval Number 13-21. As stated in the approved protocol, the purpose of this
research was to conduct a comparative analysis and characterization of Trinitite,
Kharitonchik, and Fulgurite melt-glass samples utilizing AFM in order to
demonstrate this technology's application to the field of technical nuclear
forensics. Since two of the three samples were produced during nuclear tests, it
was determined that all reasonable and appropriate safety measures and
requirements would be followed.
Therefore, we reviewed The College of William and Mary's Radiation
Safety Manual to ensure that this research was in compliance with all specified
requirements.

Furthermore, we successfully completed The College of William

and Mary's three hour Radiation Safety Course. In addition, the samples were
brought to The College of William and Mary's Radiation Safety Officer for initial
monitoring. At 13-22 pR/hr (at near contact) for the Trinitite and 25-30 jjR/hr (at
near contact) for the Kharitonchik, the samples were determined to be at or
below twice background for the Integrated Science Center and well below the
minimum survey meter sensitivity of 0.1 mREM/hr specified in The College of
William and Mary's Radiation Safety Manual. Lastly, despite the fact that these
experimental samples fell below the threshold for monitoring under The College
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of William and Mary's Radiation Safety Program, we still followed the ALARA (As
Low As Reasonably Achievable) Principle, essentially using procedures and
engineering controls based upon practical, sound, radiation protection practices
to minimize occupational doses and public exposure.

All samples were

appropriately labeled and stored in McGlothlin Street Hall Lab #307 behind a
cipher locked door. The samples were imaged in McGlothlin Street Hall Lab #39,
which was also locked for security purposes.

Full disclosure was made, on a

need to know basis, to include the opportunity to submit a Declaration of
Pregnancy. The radiation safety concepts of time, distance, and shielding were
employed at all times. Lastly, reasonable lab practices were enforced to include
the use of protective gloves, protective eyewear, frequent hand-washing,
frequent cleaning of the lab area, and no eating, drinking, smoking, or application
of cosmetics in the lab area.
The following subsections will address details regarding sample selection
and acquisition, the project planning matrix, and the lab set-up, to include the
specific equipment used during the investigation.
2.1 Sample Selection and Acquisition
Trinitite, otherwise known as "Atomsite" or "Alamogordo Glass," was
formed during the first detonation of a nuclear weapon, at the Trinity Test Site,
Alamogordo, NM, on 16 July 1945 (Trinitite, 2013). The test device, nicknamed
“The Gadget,” was a 20 kt implosion-design plutonium fission device. Trinity was
an atmospheric test conducted atop a 100 ft steel tower. The detonation created
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a crater in the Arkosic sand (composed of quartz grains and feldspar) that was
3.0 m deep and 340 m wide, ushering in the beginning of the "Atomic Age." The
blast temperature was at least 1470 °C and produced a mushroom cloud
approximately 12.1 km high (Trinity Nuclear Test, 2013). The crater material, the
weapon, and the test site infrastructure were instantly vaporized in the intense
heat of the explosion. The vaporized material was sucked into the rising fire ball,
cooled, condensed, and fell to the ground as a light green melt-glass material
(see Fig. 8).

SifiiTY2l!(
■v TOWtj
IJULY 194-

Figure 8: The Trinitite melt-glass samples (appox. 33 g) collected from the Trinity Nuclear Test
Site, Alamogordo, NM. They were sent as a gift by Dr. Byron L. Ristvet, Assistant for Nuclear
Matters (DTRA/RD-CXT), on 03 June 2013, via conventional nonhazardous shipping (Trinity Test
Site, n.d.).
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Kharitonchik, an analog of Trinitite, was formed during the Soviet Union's
first atmospheric nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk Test Site, Kazakhstan, on 29
August 1949. “RSD-1” (aka JOE-1 by U.S. intelligence) was a 22 kt implosiondesign plutonium fission device (very similar to the “Gadget” and the “Fat Man”
weapon dropped over Nagasaki, Japan).

“First Lightening,” as it was code-

named, was also an atmospheric test conducted from atop a tower.

The

subsequent detection of the resulting mushroom cloud and public disclosure of
the test accelerated the beginning of the “Cold War” (RSD-1, 2013). This porous
black melt-glass material was formed in much the same way as Trinitite and was
named after Dr. Yulii Borisovich Khariton (seated next to the weapon in Fig. 9), a
leading Russian nuclear weapons scientist (Trinitite, 2013).

Figure 9: The Kharitonchik melt-glass samples (approx 30 g) were collected from the
Semipalantinsk Nuclear Test Site, Kazakhstan. They were sent as a gift by Dr. Byron L. Ristvet,
Assistant for Nuclear Matters (DTRA/RD-CXT), on 03 June 2013, via conventional nonhazardous
shipping (Semipalantinsk Nuclear Test Site, n.d.).
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Fulgurite (from the Latin fulgar meaning thunderbolt), also known as
"Desert Glass" or "Petrified Lightning," is naturally formed in sand, silica, or soil
by lightning strikes of the earth's surface (in this case, the sand dunes at
Jockey’s Ridge State Park, NC).

The lightning, at a minimum temperature of

1,800 °C, instantly melts the sand, silica, or soil and fuses the grains together,
forming an amorphous mineraloid in the form of the hollow glass tubes pictured
in Figure 10 (Fulgurite, 2013).

Jockey's Ridge is the largest natural
sand dune on the east c

Figure 10: The Fulgurite melt-glass samples (approx 4 g) were collected at Jockey's Ridge State
Park, Dare County, NC. They were sent as a gift by Park Ranger Debo Cox, Superintendent,
Jockey Ridge State Park, on 01 May 2013, via conventional nonhazardous shipping (Jockey's
Ridge State Park, n.d.).

The Trinitite and Kharitonchik samples were specifically selected because
they represented “post-detonation” melt-glass material from well-known and
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documented events. The Fulgurite, on the other hand, was specifically selected
because it was formed by a natural process similar to the anthropogenic process
caused by a nuclear detonation but without the radiological component. As such,
it represented a non-radioactive experimental control material for comparison
purposes.
2.2 Project Planning Matrix
When conducting analysis using multiple types of microscopy, on multiple
samples, in multiple locations, using multiple sample preparation techniques, and
multiple scanning dimensions, it helped to use a planning matrix like the one
reflected in Figure 11 to keep organized.

Peeke's Project Planning Matrix (2/26)
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Figure 11: Project Planning Matrix.
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2.3 Lab Set-Up and Equipment
The AFM Lab at The College of William and Mary consists of two
extremely sensitive AFM instruments (the NT-MDT AFM and the Bruker AFM)
and is located in the basement of McGlothlin Street Flail (Lab #39) in order to
minimize interference due to structural or noise vibration. In fact, the individual
instruments rest on a platform suspended from the roof by bungee cords in order
to further dampen structural vibrations. Likewise, the walls of the AFM Lab have
acoustic foam on them to help dampen interior noise vibrations. We employed
the NT-MDT AFM System, equipped with the SMENA Tip-Scanning Head and
built-in 100pm x 100pm piezo, in contact mode (CM), utilizing a Budget brand
silicon nitride (SiNi) soft AFM probe to produce all of the AFM scans used in this
research, as depicted in Figure 12 below.

NT-MDT AFM System / SMENA Tip-Scanning
Head / Trinitite Section M ounted on AFM Base

Figure 12: AFM Lab Set-Up and Equipment.
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The large image in Figure 12 displays the NT-MDT NOVA software user
interface screen and the four quadrants of the photodiode (used for aiming the
laser), the optical image of the sample (used to help re-acquire the desired
scanning location), as well as, the live camera feed, zoomed in on the cantilever
(used to monitor the tip, as it approaches the sample surface).

Figure 13

(below) shows close-up images of the soft triangular SiNi contact mode
cantilevers "approached" to the designated landing zones for each sample type.
The tip-surface interaction is measured and recorded via the deflection of the
laser off of the cantilever and onto the photodiode. The images were taken using
the

organic

NT-MDT

NOVA

software

and

reflect viewing

windows

of

approximately 3.5 mm X 4.5 mm. We prepared the images for this report using
GIMP (GNU Image Manipulation Program), an open-source professional cross
platform raster graphics editor.

Trinitite

Kharitonchik

Fulgurite

LZ1

LZ2

Figure 13: Triangular SiNi contact mode cantilevers "approached" to the designated landing
zones for each sample type.
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3.0 RESULTS

In accordance with the Project Planning Matrix, sample preparation was
the first action to be taken. Through a process of trial and error, various sample
preparation techniques were attempted.

It was determined that "polished"

sample "sections" were preferable to "sections" exposing a sample's "natural"
surface or a sample mounted in "epoxy" with the "natural" surface exposed, as
addressed further in subsection 3.1. The next action involved optical microscopy
of each of the various sample types (sections). This step proved to be extremely
valuable in terms of identifying desirable scanning locations and reacquiring
those same locations in the AFM lab, as detailed in subsection 3.2. Following
optical microscopy, contact mode AFM scans were produced. The height signal
and friction signal images were measured and recorded for each of the three
sample types (or sections), at each of the two pre-designated LZs, for three
different scan range sizes (1 pm x 1 pm, 5 pm x 5 pm, and 10 pm x 10 pm). The
5 pm x 5 pm height signal and friction signal scans are displayed in subsection
3.3, along with Table 1, reflecting the respective contact mode AFM scanning
parameters.

In addition, three-dimensional (3D) topographical surface images

were constructed for each of the three sample types (or sections), at each of the
two pre-designated LZs, for each of the 5 pm x 5 pm scans, as displayed in
subsection 3.4.

Lastly, force curves were taken for each of the three sample

types (or sections), at each of the two pre-designated LZs, for each of the 5 pm x
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5 |jm scans. For each 5 |jm x 5 pm scan, a center point force curve and a 5 x 5
grid of force curves were measured and recorded.

For qualitative comparison

purposes, only the center point force curve for each
displayed in subsection 3.5.

5 pm x 5 pm scan is

Lastly, Table 2 reflects the relevant input

parameters for each of the displayed force curves.
3.1 Sample Preparation
We attempted a few different sample preparation techniques utilizing
epoxy cement to mount sample specimens to various substrates like mica or
metal pucks for subsequent optical microscopy and scanning with the AFM.
However, these attempts produced mixed results, primarily due to excessive
sample tilt and surface angulation during the AFM scans.

Eventually, we

adopted a sample preparation technique utilized by the NASA Langley Research
Center (LRC) Advanced Materials and Processing Branch.

This technique is

similar to the one employed by Belloni et al. (2011) to prepare thin sections for
autoradiography during their investigation of radionuclide incorporation and
distribution in Trinitite. We "potted" the samples in an acrylic "puck" using the
Buehler VariDur Powder High Performance Mounting System together with
Buehler Ultramount Hardener producing a blue mineral filled acrylic cast after a
15-30 minute cure time at room temperature.

Due to the initial size of the

Kharitonchik nugget-like sample, we used the LECO CM-24 Cut-Off Machine to
bisect it prior to potting. Then we used the Buehler IsoMet Low Speed Saw to
section each of the samples.

Lastly, we used the Buehler EcoMet-4 Variable
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Speed Grinder-Polisher at 120 rpm to sand and polish the samples, using four
different 12-inch, cloth-backed, sanding and polishing discs attached to the wheel
via

pressure-sensitive

adhesive

(PSA).

The

CAMI

(Coated

Abrasive

Manufacturers Institute) ratings for these discs were 400 and 600 grit for sanding,
while the polishing procedure used 800 and 1200 grit.

The samples were

sanded and polished, applying them by hand to the rotating discs, in sequence,
starting with the lowest grit to the highest grit, under a constant flow of water.
The equivalent average particle diameters in micrometers are 23.6 pm, 16.0 pm,
12.2 pm, and 6.5 pm, respectively (Sandpaper, n.d.). Each of the sections were
prepared in the same manner and measured approximately 30-40 mm in
diameter. This sample preparation technique solved the problem of sample tilt
and surface angulation, while providing a stable, user-friendly platform from
which to conduct optical microscopy and perform the three variations of contact
mode AFM mentioned previously (see Fig. 14 below).
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Buehler IsoMet Low Speed Saw

Buehler EcoMet-4 Variable Speed Grinder-Polisher

LECO CM-24 Cut-Off Machine

■ M

Trinitite Section

Kharitonchik Section

Fulgurite Section

Figure 14: Sample preparation at the NASA Langley Research Center Advanced Materials and
Processing Branch.

3.2 Optical Microscopy
We performed optical microscopy on each sample section in the
Nanomaterials and Imaging Lab, McGlothlin Street Hall #307, using our Nikon
SMZ800 Zoom Stereomicroscope and our Olympus IX-71 Inverted Optical
Microscope.

Optical microscopy was essential to the selection of desirable

locations for AFM scanning and subsequent attempts to reacquire those same
pre-designated locations in the AFM lab downstairs. The next three figures (Fig.
15-17) depict optical images of each sample type with two designated landing
zones (LZ) per sample type.

LZ 1 and LZ 2 represent locations where we

intended to conduct an AFM scan based on surface characteristics like flatness,
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smoothness, or an interesting topographical feature such as a grain boundary or
a color variation. The images in the left two columns were produced using the
Nikon Stereomicroscope, while the images in the right two columns were
produced using the Olympus Inverted Microscope. The yellow rings designate
the exact location of the desired landing zones at 1x, 3x, 20x, and 64x
magnifications. We used Inkscape (an open-source professional cross-platform
vector graphics editor) to process the images for this report.

LZ1

lx

3x

20x

64x

20x

64x

LZ2

lx

3x

Figure 15: Optical Microscopy - Trinitite Section.
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Figure 16: Optical Microscopy - Kharitonchik Section.

LZ1

-

.

lx

3x

20x

64x

IX

3x

20x

64x

LZ2

Figure 17: Optical Microscopy - Fulgurite Section.
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3.3 Height and Friction Signals
The next six figures (Fig. 18-23) depict AFM images taken over a five
micron by five micron area for each sample type (or section) at each of the two
pre-designated landing zones (LZ1 and LZ2). The top image shows the height
signal scan in nanometers (reflecting the sample's surface topography and
morphology). These height signal scans underwent image processing using the
NT-MDT NOVA Software's organic image flattening and fitting functions.

The

bottom image shows the friction signal scan in nanoAmps (reflecting the sample's
surface roughness). All of the height signal and friction signal scans were edited
using Gwyddion, an open-source professional cross-platform modular program
for scanning probe microscopy data visualization and analysis. Lastly, Table 1
below reflects the contact mode AFM scanning parameters used for each of the
images displayed in Figures 18-23.
Sample

Pixels

Rate

Gain

Set Point

T - LZ1

512

1.0

0.35

-1.7

T - LZ2

512

1.0

0.30

- 1.7

K - LZ1

512

0.75

0.75

-0.1

K - LZ2

512

0.75

0.35

-0.1

F - LZ1

512

1.0

0.35

-2 .0

F - LZ2

512

1.0

0.40

-1.8

Table 1: Contact Mode AFM Scanning Parameters
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Figure 18: Trinitite LZ1 Height and Friction Signals (5 |jm x 5pm scan size).
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Figure 19: Trinitite LZ2 Height and Friction Signals (5 pm x 5pm scan size).
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H eight
Signal

0.55 nA

Friction
Signal

Figure 20: Kharitonchik LZ1 Height and Friction Signals (5 |jm x 5|jm scan size).
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82.0 nm
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Signal

Friction
Signal

Figure 21: Kharitonchik LZ2 Height and Friction Signals (5 |jm x 5|jm scan size)
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2.0 nA

Friction
Signal

Figure 22: Fulgurite LZ1 Height and Friction Signals (5 pm x 5pm scan size).
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Signal

Figure 23: Fulgurite LZ2 Height and Friction Signals (5 |jm x 5pm scan size).
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Regarding the Trinitite scans (Figures 18 and 19), there is a noticeable
difference in the height range between the two pre-designated landing zones on
the Trinitite sample.

The height range for LZ1 (Figure 18) was only 15 nm,

indicating a fairly flat and smooth surface, while the height range for LZ2 (Figure
19) was 44 nm, indicating the higher topographical features associated with the
region that appeared to be a grain boundary or a material fracture under optical
microscopy.

These topographical features or ridges are approximately 0.2 to

0.25 pm wide and approximately 20 to 30 nm high. With regards to the Friction
Signals (bottom images), a color variation that was not simply caused by a
topographical feature in the Height Signal (top images), indicates a difference in
the friction force coefficient and, therefore, a difference in surface chemical
composition.

This effect is rather pronounced in the Friction Signal image in

Figure 18 (LZ1) and may be indicative of the heterogeneous mineraloid nature of
the Trinitite sample at that location.

Furthermore, the scratches that appear in

Figure 18 may have been caused by the sanding and polishing process. Picking
up, rotating, and then reapplying the sections onto the rotating disc could account
for the fact that the scratches appear in two separate directions.

Lastly, the

horizontal stripes visible in the Height Signal and Friction Signal on Figure 19 are
most likely due to some surface debris picked up by the tip.
Regarding the Kharitonchik scans (Figures 20 and 21), there are
noticeable differences between the Friction Signal and the Height Signal for LZ1,
however, the banding observed in the Friction Signal image may be the result of
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an optical interference pattern caused by the laser scattering off of the sample
surface. The use of a high-pass filter on this image may remove this banding
effect and enhance the surface roughness variations underneath, which are
clearly not associated with any topography on the corresponding height signal
image.

Furthermore, the height signal image for LZ2 (Figure 21) shows a

topographical feature equal to or exceeding 82 nm.

Because the rest of the

sample surface appears to be uniformly under 45 nm this may be indicative of a
surface contaminant or inclusion.
Regarding the Fulgurite scans (Figures 22 and 23), the parallel scratches
in these images (which are fairly consistent between the Height and Friction
signals) may be due to nano-scale abrasions induced during sample preparation
using the Variable Speed Grinder-Polisher at 120 rpm with the 400, 600, 800,
and 1200 girt sanding and polishing discs. However, while the scratches appear
to be approximately 10.0 to 12.0 nm deep and approximately 0.1 nm wide in
Figure 22 and approximately 80.0 to 90.0 nm deep and approximately 0.2 nm
wide in Figure 23, these measurements are much smaller than the 6.5 pm grain
size associated with the 1200 grit polishing disc, as discussed in section 3.1.
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3.4 Three-Dimensional Surface Topography Images
The next seven figures (Fig. 24-30) depict three-dimensional surface
topography images, over a five micron by five micron area, for each of the three
sample types (or sections), at each of the two pre-designated landing zones.
These images graphically represent the morphology, topography, and microstructural surface geometries at each of the six locations. We used GIMP (GNU
Image Manipulation Program...an open-source professional cross-platform raster
graphics editor) to prepare the three-dimensional surface topography images for
this report.

Lastly, Figure 30 displays all six of the three-dimensional surface

topography images together for a qualitative comparison.
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V tv*

Figure 24: Trinitite LZ1 3D Surface Topography Image.

r t m ir#

Figure 25: Trinitite LZ2 3D Surface Topography Image.
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Figure 26: Kharitonchik LZ1 3D Surface Topography Image.

Figure 27: Kharitonchik LZ2 3D Surface Topography Image.
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Figure 28: Fulgurite LZ1 3D Surface Topography Image.

Figure 29: Fulgurite LZ2 3D Surface Topography Image.
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Trinitite

Kharitonchik

Fulgurite

LZ1

Figure 30: 3D Surface Topography Images Combined for Comparison.
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3.5 Force Spectroscopy (Force Curves)
The next seven figures (Fig. 31-37) depict the force curves taken for each of the
three sample types (or sections), at each of the two pre-designated landing
zones, on the center point of each five micron by five micron scan. These force
curves reflect the surface adhesion at that particular point on the surface. The xaxis represents the piezo displacement in nanometers, while the y-axis
represents the cantilever deflection in nanoAmps. The red curve traces the tip
approach, while the blue curve traces tip retract. Figure 37 displays all six of the
force curves together for a qualitative comparison. Lastly, Table 2 below reflects
the relevant input parameters for each of the force curves displayed in Figures
31-37.
Cantilever
Deflection Range
- 50.0 to 4.0 nA

Sample

Mode

T -L Z 1

DFL (2)

Piezo Displacement Points
Range
4000 to - 250.0 nm
2000

T -L Z 2

DFL (2)

3000 to - 250.0 nm

2000

- 50.0 to 4.0 nA

K -LZ 1

DFL (2)

700.0 to 0.0 nm

2000

- 50.0 to 2.0 nA

K -L Z 2

DFL (2)

700.0 to 0.0 nm

2000

- 50.0 to 2.0 nA

F - LZ1

DFL (2)

6000 to 0.0 nm

2000

- 50.0 to 4.0 nA

F -L Z 2

DFL (2)

6000 to 0.0 nm

2000

- 50.0 to 4.0 nA

Table 2: Force Curve Input Parameters.
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Figure 31: Trinitite LZ1 Force Curve.
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Figure 32: Trinitite LZ2 Force Curve.
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Figure 33: Kharitonchik LZ1 Force Curve.
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Figure 34: Kharitonchik LZ2 Force Curve.
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Figure 35: Fulgurite LZ1 Force Curve.
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Figure 36: Fulgurite LZ2 Force Curve.
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Figure 37: Force Curves Combined for Comparison.

The Kharitonchik Force Curves demonstrate a fairly classic relationship
and a linear appearance. On the other hand, the Force Curves produced by the
Trinitite and Fulgurite samples are curved, potentially demonstrating a "non-linear
optical lever sensitivity" (Thormann, 2009) due to what we speculate are strongly
attractive electrostatic Coulomb forces between the tip and the sample surface
for those sample types (or sections). In simple terms, the attractive forces were
so strong that the negative laser deflection exceeded the + 30 nA photo diode
range, resulting in the curvature of the plots. Thormann et al. (2009) concluded
that it is difficult to correctly "convert detector output into real cantilever
deflection" when additional surface forces, like long-range electrostatic forces,
are experienced.

Regardless, by examining the required "pull-off' distance
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versus the difference in electric current produced by the cantilever deflection for
each Force Curve (the adhesive regime depicted as region "D" in Fig. 6), one
can qualitatively deduce that we were able to detect different adhesive forces
between the different sample types (or sections) and even between different
locations (LZs) on the same samples.
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4.0 DISCUSSION

The key to Technical Nuclear Forensics is to be able to identify
forensically useful markers or signatures (like specific impurities, crystal
structures, surface finishes, contaminants, alloying or cladding material) linking
the perpetrators to specific factors such as locations, events, materials,
processes, time, weapon type, and so on (Joint Working Group, 2008).
regards to the analysis of post-detonation

materials and debris,

With
these

investigations might provide insight into the fuel type, fuel amount, physical
makeup, operational efficiency, and design sophistication of the device.

With

regards to the analysis of pre-detonation materials, these investigations might
provide insight into a particular nuclear material's production cycle (mining,
refining, enrichment), use in reactors, recycling, or intended purpose. This initial
research focuses primarily on the analysis of post-detonation materials.

The

reason that this research is so novel is that, while previous technical nuclear
forensic research and studies involve the use of a variety of characterization
tools and techniques, there is almost no mention of AFM in the available
literature.

At the unclassified level, this author is aware of only one other

research group (at the Argon National Laboratory) that is investigating the use of
AFM to conduct Technical Nuclear Forensics on radioactive materials.

In fact,

this research group just received a Domestic Nuclear Detection Office research
grant in 2013 under the Nuclear Forensics Expertise Development Program.
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With regards to the specific results we obtained using contact mode AFM
to produce the Height and Friction Signal scans (Fig. 18-23), it is important to
note that the natural surfaces of these melt-glass samples were particularly
rough and uneven. Sanding and polishing the samples, while altering some of
the natural surface features, provided many benefits, not least, of which, was the
ability to land the tip and scan the material. In addition, it improved our ability to
acquire lateral friction force scans.

Furthermore, it was envisioned that these

sanded and polished sample sections would be particularly well-suited for
subsequent research involving dynamic, semi-contact (tapping-mode) or noncontact mode AFM imaging. Lastly, each of the Height Signal scans underwent
additional image processing to correct for substrate tilt by subtracting the surface
(using the 2D Flatten Correction Plane Fit) and to correct for unwanted artifacts
by fitting the lines (using the 1D Flatten Correction First Order Fit).

In some

cases, a Histogram Fit was performed, as well.
With regards to the three-dimensional Surface Topography Images (Fig.
24-30), these nano-scale graphical representations enhance our qualitative
understanding of the sample surface at these locations, however, further
quantitative analysis techniques, for instance measuring "maximum peak heights
(Hpm), average maximum height (Hz), average maximum valley depths (Hvm),
peak-to-valley distances (Rz), and the root mean square roughness (Rms)" using
image analysis software (like Image J) would be the logical next step (Chen,
2011).

These kinds of surface morphology parameters would provide more
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precise and measurable information regarding pore shape and size, grain shape
and size, grain boundary morphology, and micro-structural orientation.

This

information may, in turn, provide valuable insight regarding parameters like the
heat, pressure, fuel, efficiency, and height of burst.

In cases involving pre

detonation materials, this kind of quantitative analysis could provide valuable
insight regarding, for example, specific signatures and markers associated with
uranium oxide pellet fabrication to include particle size distribution and particle
inclusions or occlusions (IAEA, 2006).
With regards to Force Spectroscopy or taking Force Curves (Fig. 31-37),
there are a few important things to understand. Unlike dynamic mode AFM, the
cantilever is not "driven" (vibrated) and the X & Y directions of the piezo are
fixed, while the piezo moves only in the Z direction in order to approach the
cantilever to the surface and retract it back to the initial position, measuring the
tip-surface potential (stiffness and adhesion), in accordance with the LennardJones Potential discussed previously (Fig. 3). These Force Curves are useful as
a qualitative characterization of the tip-surface potential and not a quantitative
analysis. To perform a quantitative analysis, one would have to determine the
actual spring constant of the cantilever and then calculate the deflection
calibration of that particular cantilever. Although challenging, it is certainly not
impossible to do, however, it exceeded the scope of this initial research project.
After working with these materials for a few months, experimenting with
different sample preparation techniques, and employing various AFM modes, we
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successfully realized many of the initial research goals and objectives. However,
we also observed that the characterization and analysis of post-detonation
material requires a fair degree of reverse-engineering, which can be rather
challenging. Therefore, we speculate that the analysis of "known" pre-detonation
materials for specific properties may be more straight forward and thus present a
rather lucrative target for additional AFM analysis.

In fact, it is presumed that

"nuclear forensics can, with high reliability, reach certain conclusions but those
may not be sufficient to uniquely identify the source. The more extensive the
database and libraries of sample materials and associated isotopic analyses are,
the more specific attribution can be" (Joint Working Group, 2008).
Perhaps, in the future, we can expand on our initial qualitative force
spectroscopy work to include quantitative analysis techniques. We can explore
AFM dynamic modes to include semi-contact and non-contact scanning to
analyze surface energy and stiffness. We can investigate the use of specialized
or modified AFM probes to detect specific markers or signatures like chemical
impurities, surface contaminants, and material inclusions.

We can attempt to

navigate the requirements for conducting classified research and incorporate
investigations using radioactive samples and pre-cursor materials. And lastly, we
can

consider

using

other

characterization

tools

like

Scanning

Electron

Microscopy and Petrography, together with AFM, in order to improve our overall
understanding of the samples under investigation.
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5.0 CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we explored a novel approach to Technical Nuclear
Forensics utilizing Atomic Force Microscopy as part of the counter-response to a
very serious problem...a terrorist attack using a nuclear or radiological device.
We conducted an initial proof of concept, using qualitative analysis to perform a
comparative nano-scale characterization of three specifically selected melt-glass
samples representing post-detonation materials.

And we proposed numerous

opportunities for future research in this field.
More specifically, we utilized contact mode AFM to successfully collect
very precise three-dimensional height data with nano-scale resolution from
samples

of

topography.

post-detonation

material

reflecting

surface

morphology

and

In addition, we obtained lateral friction force data that graphically

demonstrated variations in surface roughness (or friction coefficients) indicating
the presence of different chemical compositions at the surface of these materials.
Furthermore, we produced force curves that qualitatively demonstrate variations
in surface adhesion between the various melt-glass samples, as well as,
between various locations on the same melt-glass sample.

And lastly, we were

able to detect a significant difference in electrostatic coulomb forces between
various sample types, which was an unexpected but very interesting outcome
meriting further investigation.
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Some potential applications of this initial investigation and subsequent
research efforts include supporting various non-proliferation initiatives such as
the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office-led interagency effort to develop a Global
Nuclear Detection Architecture, supporting the development of the International
Atomic Energy Agency's Strengthened Safeguards System, and supporting the
known nuclear explosive materials international database. Furthermore, this type
of research could lead to direct support of the National Technical Nuclear
Forensics mission by developing and fielding a hardened and deployable AFMtype device for response operations. With some modification, particularly with
respect to working with hot radioactive sources, a system leveraging all the
advantages listed in section 1.2 could prove to be useful in operational settings.
However, more research would have to be conducted in order to determine the
feasibility of this approach.
In closing, we determined that AFM may be valuable to the technical
nuclear forensics mission, particularly, if used in conjunction with other analytical
methods and characterization tools.

Further research using additional AFM

modes and quantitative analysis techniques is warranted and may lead to further
collaboration with NASA Langley Research Center, Argon National Laboratory,
and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, as well as, future consideration
under the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Nuclear Forensics Expertise
Development Program.
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